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INTRODUCTION
“Cams on cops.” The terse three-word slogan, painted in green
lettering on a homemade poster, held by a protester on a Seattle,
Washington, street corner, deftly encapsulated a tidal shift in policing
well underway in cities near and far.1 In fact, across the state in Airway
Heights, a town in Spokane County with a population one-hundredth the
size of Seattle’s,2 patrol officers had been filming with body-worn
cameras since 2009.3 The cameras, Airway Heights Police Chief Lee
Bennett had said, “were on sale.”4 And the cameras’ footage proved to be
unbiased and useful, he told an Eastern Washington media outlet.5 His
department, staffed with twenty-some officers, refers to video footage as
“the third witness.”6
By 2014, a “third witness” for overseeing police and civilian
interactions—not only in Washington State, but in states across the
nation—was in popular demand.7 The year spawned massive citizen
protests; people started to organize in record numbers on streets, in
community centers, in churches, and in virtual spaces like Tumblr,
Facebook, and Twitter8 to thrust into the national spotlight a widespread
disquiet over police shootings of unarmed racial minorities.9 The name at
the forefront of the movement belonged to Michael Brown, a black
eighteen-year-old who was shot and killed in 2014 by Darren Wilson, a

*

J.D. Candidate 2017. Special thanks to the editing team of Seattle University Law Review.
1. Ansel Herz, Why the ACLU of Washington Opposes the State Proposal on Body Cameras,
STRANGER: SLOG (Apr. 14, 2015, 11:51 AM), http://www.thestranger.com/blogs/slog/
2015/04/14/22050526/why-the-aclu-of-washington-opposes-the-state-proposal-on-body-cameras
[https://perma.cc/W3X3-FDXG].
2. Recent estimates put Seattle’s population at 684,451 residents and Airway Heights’s at
6,639 residents. QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/
53/5300905.html?cssp=SERP [https://perma.cc/K64P-UJUC].
3. See Erik Loney, Spokane Law Enforcement Want Third Eye, KXLY
(Feb. 25, 2011, 4:17 AM), http://www.kxly.com/news/Spokane-Law-Enforcement-Want-ThirdEye/682376 [https://perma.cc/UY3T-QYC3].
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. JAY STANLEY, ACLU, POLICE BODY-MOUNTED CAMERAS: WITH RIGHT POLICIES IN PLACE,
A WIN FOR ALL, VERSION 2.0 1–2 (2015), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/
police_body-mounted_cameras-v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/W64R-EEDG] (finding that police
body-worn cameras arose to address the “growing recognition that the United States has a real
problem with police violence”).
8. Rubina Madan Fillion, How Ferguson Protestors Use Social Media to Organize, WALL
STREET J.: DISPATCH (Nov. 24, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/dispatch/2014/11/24/how-fergusonprotesters-use-social-media-to-.organize/.
9. See Larry Buchanan et al., What Happened in Ferguson?, N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ferguson-missouri-town-under-siege-afterpolice-shooting.html?_r=0 (last updated Aug. 10, 2015).
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white police officer.10 A grand jury’s decision not to indict Wilson for
Brown’s death ignited civilian clashes with police in Brown’s home city
of Ferguson, Missouri, so severe that windows shattered, buildings
blazed, tear gas sprayed, and rubber bullets flew.11 County officials
declared a state of emergency.12
The problem: a perception of officers using force—sometimes
deadly force—in unreasonable contexts and in racially motivated ways.13
The solution: more oversight of the police by civilians.14 The
means: body-worn cameras—clip-on devices, usually smaller than a
deck of cards, attached to an officer’s eyewear or uniform lapel15—that
would allow officers to capture their encounters with the public on video.
Cameras on cops: it was the pragmatic solution that many cities
chose.16 Body-worn camera programs were designed to encourage
officers to follow department policies, to deter excessive use of force, to
exonerate officers from unsupported claims of misconduct and
groundless citizen complaints, to gather better evidence at crime scenes
and, perhaps most importantly, to make everyday policing practices
transparent in the wake of soured relationships between the force and the
community.17
The idea took hold across the country.18 From Damascus, Virginia,
a town with a population hovering at about 800 residents19 and four
full-time police officers,20 to New York City,21 cities moved swiftly to
adopt body-worn camera pilot programs.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See The Harvard Law Review Ass’n, Development in the Law Policing: Chapter Four
Considering Police Body Cameras, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1794, 1794–95 (2015) [hereinafter Considering Police Body Cameras].
14. See id.
15. STANLEY, supra note 7, at 1.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 18–21.
17. Bryce Clayton Newell, Collateral Visibility: Police Body Cameras, Public Discourse, and
Privacy 61 (2016–17) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Indiana Law Journal).
18. LINDSAY MILLER, JESSICA TOLIVER & POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM,
IMPLEMENTING A BODY-WORN CAMERA PROGRAM: RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED
1–2 (2014) [hereinafter MILLER].
19. See Damascus, VA Profile: Facts, Map & Data, VA HOMETOWNLOCATOR
(July 1, 2015), http://virginia.hometownlocator.com/va/washington/damascus.cfm [https://perma.cc/
8FDY-UVR7].
20. Kevin Johnson, Lack of Training, Standards Mean Big Problems for Small Police
Departments, USA TODAY (June 23, 2015, 4:39 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
nation/2015/06/23/small-police-departments-standards-training/28823849/ [https://perma.cc/B6JNBA5U].
21. MARC JONATHAN BLITZ, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y FOR LAW & POLICY, POLICE
BODY-WORN CAMERAS: EVIDENTIARY BENEFITS AND PRIVACY THREATS 3–4 (May 2015).
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Cameras on cops: whether the policy was a solution, a preventative
measure, or a new trend already underway in policing, it was the move
that 25% of the nation’s 17,000 police agencies chose in the last few
years and an option that 80% are currently considering or testing.22 The
Department of Justice loudly endorsed the programs by supplying more
than $23.2 million in funding to seventy-three local and tribal agencies in
thirty-two states with the aim of “expand[ing] the use of body-worn
cameras and explor[ing] their impact.”23 Some lawmakers even favored
body-worn cameras enough to make them mandatory; in June 2015,
South Carolina became the first state to require all law enforcement
departments to implement body-worn camera programs.24
But, does privacy shrink as accountability grows? Some experts
worry that body-worn cameras will infringe on the unique safeguards
that states, including Washington, have built into their legal frameworks
to protect privacy.25 Take, for example, Technology and Liberty Director
for the ACLU of Washington, Jared Friend, who voiced the fear that
body-worn cameras could “ultimately amount to thousands of roaming
surveillance cameras that will . . . capture all kinds of sensitive
interactions.”26
As departments pilot and implement body-worn cameras programs,
researchers and scholars have raised concerns over protecting both the
privacy of people who find themselves subjects of body-worn camera
footage and the rights of citizens to obtain videos under state public
record acts.27 A spike of state legislation28 has begun to respond to these

22. STANLEY, supra note 7, at 1.
23. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Justice Department Awards
over $23 Million in Funding for Body Worn Camera Pilot Program to Support Law Enforcement
Agencies
in
32
States,
U.S.
DEPT.
OF
JUSTICE
(Sept.
21,
2015),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-awards-over-23-million-funding-body-worncamera-pilot-program-support-law [https://perma.cc/9KKZ-6692].
24. Rich Williams, South Carolina First State to Require Body-Worn Police Cameras, NAT’L
CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (June 10, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/blog/2015/06/10/south-carolinafirst-state-to-require-body-worn-police-cameras.aspx [https://perma.cc/8E9G-F9H3].
25. In Washington, these privacy safeguards rest on Article I, Section 7 of the
state constitution. See WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
26. Herz, supra note 1.
27. Police departments are hardly deaf to these concerns. Interestingly, Timothy Clemans, the
civilian who brought this issue to the forefront in Seattle by making a public records request for
every video the police had recorded with a body camera, was hired by the police department to help
it deal with the massive amount of video data they had begun to accumulate. See Mark Harris, The
Body Cam Hacker Who Schooled the Police, BACKCHANNEL (May 22, 2015),
https://medium.com/backchannel/the-body-cam-hacker-who-schooled-the-policec046ff7f6f13#.
t38q9fei8 [https://perma.cc/95LU-ARGD].
28. Thirty-four states, as of May 2015, are considering new laws regulating body-worn
cameras. Law Enforcement Overview, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (May 29, 2015),
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concerns. Bills, including one signed into law on April 1, 2016, in
Washington State, set guidelines limiting the disclosure of some sensitive
or offensive footage to protect the identities of civilians filmed in homes,
hospitals, and other intimate settings.29
However other questions linger. Should officers review videos—
perhaps stopping, slowing, or zooming in on images—when preparing to
testify for the State at criminal proceedings? Can police departments use
images from body-worn cameras to create criminal profiles?30 Friend’s
question—“Are [police] allowed to use the data they’ve collected for
other purposes?”—crystalizes this general uneasiness.31
This Note contributes to a growing body of work that weighs the
gains that communities stand to make from police body-worn cameras
against the tangle of concerns about how cameras may infringe on
individual liberties and tread on existing privacy laws. While police
departments have quickly implemented cameras over the past few years,
laws governing the use of the footage body-worn cameras capture still
trail behind.32 Notably, admissibility rules for footage from an officer’s
camera, and evidence obtained with the help of that footage, remain on
the horizon.33
This Note focuses exclusively on Washington State’s laws.34 It
takes a clinical approach by addressing two areas in which body-worn
cameras as a government evidence-gathering tool may clash with privacy
laws in Washington: the state’s plain view doctrine and the Washington
State Privacy Act.
This Note argues that courts should restrict evidence from
body-worn cameras when that evidence defies the boundaries of the plain
view doctrine or when it captures a protected conversation under the
Privacy Act. Part I discusses the background in which body-worn
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/law-enforcement.aspx
[https://perma.cc/
T8DM-TFWM].
29. H.B. 2362, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2016).
30. See Rachel La Corte, Washington Senate Passes Bill on Police Body Cameras, SEATTLE
TIMES (Mar. 4, 2016, 8:02 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/crime/washington-senatepasses-bill-on-police-body-cameras/ [https://perma.cc/J4WX-VRK6].
31. Sydney Brownstone, The Seattle Police Department is Pondering What to Do with Body
Cam Data, STRANGER: SLOG (June 24, 2015, 1:53 PM), http://www.thestranger.com/blogs/slog/
2015/06/24/22445782/seattle-police-department-is-considering-predictive-policing [https://perma.cc/
7857-N59F].
32. MILLER, supra note 18, at 2.
33. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, LEGAL ISSUES SURROUNDING THE USE OF BODY
CAMERAS, 1, 8 (2015) [hereinafter LEGAL ISSUES].
34. The use of body-worn cameras has the potential to brush up against the privacy laws of a
number of states. However, the scope of this Note is limited to Washington’ laws to provide a
focused example of how evidence-gathering with body cameras might come into conflict with one
state’s legal framework.
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cameras gained popularity, specifically unpacking their role in the
community policing model; it then outlines Washington’s hesitancy to
embrace law enforcement’s strides to enhance its evidence-gathering
abilities through technology. Part II discusses the problems in
determining whether footage obtained in the course of an officer’s duties
is admissible under the plain view doctrine. Part III examines the
potential for cameras to capture the audio of conversations that the
Privacy Act protects. Part IV argues that trial courts should be cognizant
of the strong potential for body-worn camera footage and audio to
influence juries; it advocates for courts to play a gatekeeping role and
suppress evidence derived from body-worn cameras (1) when such
evidence fails to meet the requirements of a plain view seizure or (2)
when it contains a conversation recorded in violation of the Privacy Act.
I. POLICE BODY-WORN CAMERAS AS BOTH A REMEDY AND A LOGICAL
NEXT STEP; WASHINGTON AS A PROTECTOR OF PRIVACY
The use of police body-worn cameras arose both in response to
civilian misgivings of police displays of force and as a logical step to
further the goals of information gathering in community policing.
However, Washington’s laws—both state supreme court decisions and
legislative mandates underscoring the state’s commitment to
safeguarding privacy—erect a resistance to law enforcement drawing
from new technology to augment its evidence-gathering capabilities.
A. Body-Worn Cameras: Information-Gathering Instruments to Further
Community Policing Goals
Some have observed that police departments’ body-worn camera
programs unveil a new era of police oversight.35 This era, some scholars
suggest, is marked by a growing schism between the police and the
citizenry.36 The narrative is one that a textbook written years into the
future might recount as follows, police shootings and inordinate displays
of force demanded increased transparency from police officers; cities and
police departments responded by self-monitoring with body-worn
cameras.37 Yet, the story is hardly so simple.

35. Elise Hu, Using Technology to Counter Police Mistrust is Complicated, NPR
(Sept. 2, 2014, 12:10 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2014/09/02/345208359/
using-technology-to-counter-police-mistrust-is-complicated [https://perma.cc/38RZ-EZMZ].
36. STANLEY, supra note 7, at 2. See generally Barak Ariel, Tony Farrar & Alex Sutherland,
The Effect of Police Body-Worn Cameras on Use of Force and Citizens’ Complaints Against the
Police: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 31 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 509, 509 (2015).
37. See Considering Police Body Cameras, supra note 13, at 1794.
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Some police departments, including Seattle’s, point out that they
started to consider cameras before the protests following the death of
Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri.38 Moreover, police officers and
their supervisors largely welcomed body-worn camera programs.39 And
for good cause—one of the first comprehensive studies unpacking the
effects of body-worn cameras, conducted in Rialto, California, found that
civilian complaints against officers dropped by 88% after officers started
wearing cameras.40 Police department supervisors and officers cite other
benefits of the cameras, namely that they preserve evidence that could—
and often does—evaporate before trial.41 Carlos Ramirez, a California
police officer, highlighted that “[b]y the time [domestic violence] cases
get to court often things have cooled down and the victim retracts. But
with the video you see her with the bloody lip. There’s nothing lost in
translation.”42
Body-worn cameras might have been a natural and predictable next
step to improve upon the model of community policing that started to
take hold in the second half of the twentieth century.43 A 1998
newsletter, cosponsored by Harvard Law School and the Department of
Justice, describes some of the key features of community policing:
[These features include] information gathering, victim counseling
and services, community organizing and consultation, education,
walk-and-ride and knock-on-door programs, as well as regular
patrol, specialized forms of patrol, and rapid response to emergency
calls for service. Emphasis is placed on information sharing
between patrol and detectives to increase the possibility of crime
solution and clearance.44

38. SPD Answers Your Questions on Body Cameras, SPD BLOTTER (Dec. 12, 2014, 6:33 PM),
http://spdblotter.seattle.gov/2014/12/12/spd-answers-your-questions-on-body-cameras/
[https://perma.cc/CET9-5QYB] [hereinafter SPD Answers Your Questions]. Arguably, for a number
of years independent pressures had weighed on Seattle to adopt a comprehensive police oversight
program because the department had entered into a consent decree with the Department of Justice in
December 2011. See The Seattle Consent Decree: How It Came About, What It Is, and What the
Monitor Does, SEATTLE POLICE MONITOR, http://www.seattlemonitor.com/overview/
[https://perma.cc/8V3E-S3TR].
39. Rory Carroll, California Police Use of Body Cameras Cuts Violence and Complaints,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 4, 2013 12:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/04/californiapolice-body-cameras-cuts-violence-complaints-rialto [https://perma.cc/M4HB-VJB9].
40. Ariel, Farrar & Sutherland, supra note 36, at 524.
41. Carroll, supra note 39.
42. Id.
43. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, UNDERSTANDING COMMUNITY POLICING: A
FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION 1, 5–7 (Aug. 1994).
44. George L. Kelling & Mark H. Moore, The Evolving Strategy of Policing, 4 PERSP. ON
POLICING
1,
12–13
(Nov.
1998),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/114213.pdf
[https://perma.cc/28TM-A7Y6].
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This characterization of community policing focuses on
information gathering.45 Successful community policing—even nearly
twenty years ago as it was understood then by the newsletter’s authors—
hinged, in large part, on the police obtaining information from the people
who resided in the areas they served. To do so, officers were to talk to
citizens and create partnerships with business, church, and community
leaders.46 They were to spend time on the city blocks that made up their
beat, to have their eyes and ears on the street, and to have a more
continuous presence in the community than they ever had before.47
Police departments started to recognize that more local information from
the community—including information from informants about the
identities of criminals and hotspots for crime—served them well in
locating criminal activity.48
When police record a crime, the film often captures evidence. The
film preserves a record from which prosecutors and defense attorneys
can craft arguments in court. Video from a body-worn camera furnishes
more life and color than even a carefully detailed, written police report.49
It provides a better record than an officer trying to recall at trial what
evidence he uncovered at a crime scene weeks or months before.50 Thus,
body-worn cameras not only rose in popularity to ensure police and
citizens both remained on their best behavior,51 but also because filming
is a way to gather information and to collect useful evidence.
B. Washington’s Restrictions on New Evidence-Gathering Tools
Washington, however, has not always welcomed technological
advances in evidence-gathering. . In the face of wiretapping,52 the global
positioning system,53 and thermal imaging,54 Washington’s legislature
and courts have announced limitations on new technology-based tools,
sometimes years ahead of federal rules. This trend aligns with the robust
45. Id.
46. See generally id.
47. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 43, at 21–22.
48. Id. at 9–10.
49. Newell, supra note 17, at 12–13 (citing TONY MCNULTY & PATRICIA SCOTLAND, POLICE
AND CRIME STANDARDS DIRECTORATE, Foreword to MARTIN GOODALL, POLICE & CRIME
STANDARDS DIRECTORATE, GUIDANCE FOR THE POLICE USE OF BODY-WORN VIDEO DEVICES 5
(2007)).
50. Id.
51. See Carroll, supra note 39.
52. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.030 (1986); 1986 Wash. Sess. Laws 160–61.
53. State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 224 (Wash. 2003) (holding that the installation of a GPS
tracker on a vehicle is a search and typically requires a warrant).
54. State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 598 (Wash. 1994) (holding that thermal imaging of a home
was a search and that this warrantless use of technology violated Washington’s state constitution).
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privacy protections engendered in Article I, Section 7 of the constitution
of the State of Washington, which extend beyond those contained in the
federal Constitution.55 Section 7 provides: “No person shall be disturbed
in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.”56
Washington courts have held this language, unlike the Fourth
Amendment, provides sweeping privacy protections and “no express
limitations” on a Washington State resident’s privacy interest.57 Other
state courts agree that Washington’s constitution engenders a broader
recognition of individual privacy rights than most state constitutions.58
Washington, therefore, provides a particularly interesting context in
which to examine the intersection of police body-worn cameras as
evidence-gathering tools with privacy protections in state law.
II. A PLAIN VIEW OF EVIDENCE OR A PLAIN RECORD OF EVIDENCE?
Washington, like all states,59 follows the plain view doctrine.60
Generally, police officers cannot search constitutionally protected areas,
or areas in which people enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy,
without a search warrant.61 Warrants do not authorize a general search of
an area; rather, they must be specific.62 Warrants must describe with
particularity the location to be searched and the items officers intend to
discover63 in order to “eliminate[] the danger of unlimited discretion in
the executing officer’s determination of what to seize.”64
The plain view doctrine, however, is an exception to the warrant
requirement that gives some discretion back to officers. It authorizes
police to lawfully seize evidence they plainly perceive65 without a
warrant in a constitutionally protected area so long as two requirements
are satisfied. First, officers must have a prior justification for an intrusion

55. State v. Valdez, 224 P.3d 751, 756–57 (Wash. 2009); see also State v. Arreola, 290 P.3d
983, 988 (Wash. 2012) (noting that Article I, Section 7 of Washington’s constitution is “grounded in
a broad right to privacy and the need for legal authorization in order to disturb that right”).
56. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
57. State v. Ferrier, 960 P.2d 927, 930 (Wash. 1998).
58. See Hageman v. Goshen Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 256 P.3d 487, 494 (Wyo. 2011)
(discussing how Washington, unlike other states, elected to make the requirement of a warrant
essential to determining the constitutionality of the search).
59. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136 (1990) (holding that evidence obtained under the
plain view doctrine does not violate the Fourth Amendment).
60. State v. Ruem, 313 P.3d 1156, 1160 (Wash. 2013).
61. Id.
62. State v. Perrone, 834 P.2d 611, 614 (Wash. 1992).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 615.
65. The plain view doctrine is not limited in application to evidence officers see; it also applies
to evidence that officers touch. See State v. Hudson, 874 P.2d 160, 166 (Wash. 1994).
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into the protected area.66 Second, the evidence’s incriminating nature
must be immediately apparent.67 If the government fails to establish that
both of these requirements were met, the evidence is tainted and courts
will exclude it in a subsequent criminal proceeding.68
Footage from an officer’s body-worn camera is problematic in light
of both of the plain view doctrine’s requirements. First, body-worn
cameras can record images of evidence in a protected location where an
officer lacks a prior justification for being. Second, body-worn cameras
may record images of evidence which officers do not perceive as
incriminating at the time, but later, upon reviewing a segment of footage,
identify as evidence of a crime.
A. Filming Without a Lawful Presence? Footage Captured in
Constitutionally Protected Contexts
Evidence derived from body-worn police cameras becomes
problematic upon considering the doctrine’s initial requirement that an
officer have a prior justification, or lawful reason, for being in the area in
which the officer uncovers evidence in plain view.69 Washington, like
most states, requires that police meet this “lawful presence” requirement
as a threshold condition before determining whether evidence was
properly seized.70 If an officer collects physical evidence from a
protected area without prior authorization—for example, if the officer
gathers the plain view evidence in the course of an illegal search—the
evidence is the fruit of an unlawful seizure and will not be admissible at
a subsequent criminal trial.71
Generally, a search warrant provides an officer with a prior
justification to enter and search a protected area.72 An officer may also
have a prior justification for being in a protected area when exigent
circumstances require the officer to enter, when the officer has consent to
66. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 128 (1990) (explaining that the federal plain view
doctrine no longer requires that officers who seize evidence in plain view also meet a third
requirement, that the evidence be discovered inadvertently). While Washington cases before Horton
recognized the inadvertency requirement, Washington’s supreme court and appellate courts
now consistently follow Horton and recognize only the two elements of the plain view doctrine
Horton sets out—that officers have a prior justification and the evidence holds immediately
incriminating nature. See Ruem, 313 P.3d at 1160; State v. O’Neill, 62 P.3d 489, 500 (Wash. 2003);
State v. Ring, 364 P.3d 853, 857 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015).
67. See Horton, 496 U.S. at 128.
68. Ruem, 313 P.3d at 1164.
69. State v. Hatchie, 166 P.3d 698, 702 (Wash. 2007).
70. Id.; see also Ruem, 313 P.3d at 1160.
71. Ruem, 313 P.3d at 1165 (holding that information gathered in plain view will not support a
subsequent search warrant based on that information if it was obtained while an officer was
unlawfully present at a home).
72. See State v. Garvin, 207 P.3d 1266, 1270 (Wash. 2009).
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enter, or when the officer is performing a search incident to a valid
arrest.73 When officers lack search warrants to enter a protected area, the
rules surrounding the lawfulness of their presence also often hinge on the
reasonable expectation of privacy a person enjoys in the protected
space—the justifications for an inspection of a vehicle for suspected
illicit materials is distinct from those authorizing an officer to enter a
bedroom to look for concealed contraband.74
The home is one locale where Washington residents enjoy a
substantial expectation of privacy.75 Thus, a home search offers an
illustration of how an officer might gather “plain view” evidence without
a prior justification.76 Unlike the majority of states, Washington requires
that officers conducting a “knock and talk”77 at a residence inform the
occupants that they have the right to deny the officer’s request to search
the home.78 Further, officers must inform the occupants that they “can
revoke, at any time, the consent that they give, and can limit the scope of
the consent to certain areas of the home.”79 This stringent informed
consent standard prevents officers from seizing evidence in plain view at
a residence after consent to search the home is withdrawn.80
In State v. Ruem, for example, the court held officers unlawfully
continued a search when, despite smelling burnt marijuana and seeing
marijuana starter plants in plain view, they continued to remain in a
mobile home after the resident of the home revoked consent for the
officers to be present.81 Although the court found the initial entry into

73. Id.
74. Compare State v. Tyler, 302 P.3d 165, 174 (Wash. 2013) (holding that consent is not a
requirement for an inventory search of an impounded vehicle after a driver has been taken into
custody), with State v. Kull, 118 P.3d 307, 311 (Wash. 2005) (holding that the government’s failure
to show consent or a concern for officer safety rendered a warrantless search of a woman’s bedroom
unlawful and that evidence in plain view seized in the course of the search should have been
suppressed).
75. See State v. Ross, 4 P.3d 130, 135 (Wash. 2000).
76. Id.
77. A “knock and talk” occurs when police approach a home without probable cause of
criminal activity and request consent to search the home. MARK L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: THE POLICE 218 (5th ed. 2015) (discussing a majority of states’ rule that
officers do not always need to inform residents they can refrain from consenting to a police officer’s
request to search their homes).
78. See State v. Ferrier, 960 P.2d 927, 934 (Wash. 1998).
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., State v. Ruem, 313 P.3d 1156, 1165 (Wash. 2013).
81. Id. at 1164. Ruem was decided prior to the approval of Washington’s Initiative 502, which
removed criminal penalties for recreational use of marijuana by people twenty-one years old or
older. Fact Sheet: Initiative 502’s Impact on the Washington State Liquor and Cannabis Board,
WASH. ST. LIQUOR & CANNABIS BOARD, http://www.liq.wa.gov/mj2015/fact-sheet
[https://perma.cc/3F9P-GHSL].
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defendant Ruem’s home lawful,82 the officers exceeded the scope of their
consent when they continued to search the premises once Ruem told
them, “This is not a good time.”83 Thus, the evidence officers uncovered
in plain view was compromised because their prior justification for being
at Ruem’s residence vanished when he withdrew consent.84
The plain view doctrine’s “prior justification” requirement and
body-worn cameras also clash outside the context of a “knock and talk”
at a home. In State v. Ring, a Washington appellate court held that an
officer’s plain view discovery of a an aluminum can with
white powdered residue, which he immediately recognized as
methamphetamine, was unlawful because a portion of the search warrant
was overbroad and, therefore, invalid.85 The appellate court reversed the
defendant’s conviction of possession of a controlled substance86 because
the trial court committed prejudicial error in admitting evidence of the
trash can under the plain view doctrine.87
The use of body-worn cameras in situations underlying cases such
as Ruem and Ring blurs the line between evidence that officers obtain
legally and that which they may collect without the authority of law. In
the context of a “knock and talk,” body-worn cameras will assist in
documenting an indisputable record of an officer issuing—or failing to
issue—a warning to home residents of their rights to refuse consent to a
search. But at the doorway and inside, the cameras can also record a
wide range of other objects, people, and activities in the home.
Furthermore, during a search, cameras will capture images of any space
an officer moves through, regardless of whether a court later determines
the officer should not have entered that location. Because cameras are
generally mounted on an officer’s glasses, hat, or lapel,88 officers lack
complete control of everything the camera catches. While an officer
might record images of evidence listed in a warrant, her camera is likely
to capture more.
This becomes particularly problematic in cases like Ring, in which
the court noticed the officer who searched the shipping container was
82. In this case, while officers did not give Ferrier warnings, the court determined their entry
was still lawful because Ruem voluntarily consented, and the officer’s purpose in entering the
mobile home was to look for another suspect, not to search the home. Ruem, 313 P.3d at 1163.
83. Id. at 1164.
84. Id. at 1163–64.
85. State v. Ring, 364 P.3d 853, 857 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015) (explaining that although portions
of the officers’ warrant were valid, the overbroad, invalid portions could not be severed from the
valid portions, thus the entire search was rendered unlawful).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. GREG HURLEY, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, BODY WORN CAMERAS AND THE COURTS
1, 3 (2016).
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“not aware of the purpose of the warrant, and could not remember
exactly what the deputies were searching for.”89 Not only will an officer
with a body-worn camera in this context leave with the memory of
evidence he saw, he will leave with footage corroborating it.
A recording from the scene of a search—or another lawful
intrusion—may match the officer’s memory of objects or contraband the
officer noticed. Yet, it may also offer a broader, clearer, or more
convincing picture of what lay beyond an area the law authorized an
officer to enter. Notably, in Ruem, the court made it clear that it was
improper for the officers to base a warrant request on their plain view
observation of the marijuana plants in the home because they made this
observation in an unjustified context—after Ruem had revoked consent
by telling officers it was not a good time for them to be in his mobile
home.90 Yet will officers be able to base warrant requests on video
footage they obtain in constitutionally protected areas they lacked a
justification for entering? This question, as well as the question of
whether video footage may properly be admitted as stand-alone
evidence, however, has yet to be addressed by the Washington
Supreme Court.91
B. Immediately Incriminating or Immediately Incriminating
Upon a Second Look?
The plain view doctrine’s second requirement appears, at first
blush, less entangled with privacy concerns than its first: evidence must
hold an immediately incriminating nature at the time it is seized.92 The
second requirement serves a straightforward normative idea: police
should generally only gather evidence specific that their search warrants
predicts.93 They should not enjoy free reign in executing a warrant94 to
gather evidence of other crimes or “extend a general exploratory search
from one object to another until something incriminating at last
89. Ring, 364 P.3d at 857.
90. State v. Ruem, 313 P.3d 1156, 1164 (Wash. 2013).
91. LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 33, at 8.
92. State v. Hatchie, 166 P.3d 698, 702 (Wash. 2007).
93. See, e.g., State v. Perrone, 834 P.2d 611, 614–15 (Wash. 1992) (“[T]he purposes of the
search warrant particularity requirement are the prevention of general searches, prevention of the
seizure of objects on the mistaken assumption that they fall within the issuing magistrate’s
authorization, and prevention of the issuance of warrants on loose, vague, or doubtful bases of
fact.”).
94. Officers can lawfully make privacy intrusions into protected areas without warrants under
exigent circumstances. See, e.g., State v. Moore, 120 P.3d 635, 640–41 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005)
(holding that an officer could lawfully pull over a vehicle registered to a person listed as
“missing/endangered” in a government database for the sole purpose of determining whether the
missing person was in the car).
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emerges.”95 When officers unpredictably encounter evidence that blatantly suggests criminal activity, however, it contravenes common sense that
they ought to ignore it.96 Evidence that falls into this category is limited
to objects that will lead to an arrest or display a “sufficient nexus with
the crime under investigation.”97 Washington’s plain view doctrine also
encompasses “plain touch,” “plain smell,” and “plain hearing.”98
Generally, Washington courts have held the “immediately
apparent” requirement means officers must instantly recognize that what
they see (or touch or smell or hear) is contraband or evidence of a
crime.99 If officers make this determination, they may seize the
evidence.100 Washington law does not demand officers know with
unflinching certainty that an object or substance before them bears a
relation to a crime but does require that, “considering the surrounding
facts and circumstances, the police can reasonably conclude they have
evidence before them.”101 An officer’s experience also matters:
knowledge an officer gains though prior narcotics investigations, for
example, is relevant in determining whether it was reasonable for the
officer to assume a substance is an illegal drug.102
The “immediately apparent requirement” prevents officers in the
field from gathering objects they encounter in the course of a lawful
search if they need to further investigate them before deciphering their
incriminating characteristics. In State v. Murray, for example, officers
seized evidence unrelated to the theft they were investigating—in this
case, a television set that police observed in plain view during an
otherwise lawful search of an apartment.103 The court held this evidence
was tainted.104 Even though the police had a warrant to search the
apartment for evidence, they “did not know the television set was
incriminating until after the serial numbers had been checked with police
headquarters.”105 Put simply, the law does not vest in police the

95. State v. Murray, 527 P.2d 1303, 1307 (Wash. 1974) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971)).
96. Id.
97. State v. Terrovona, 716 P.2d 295, 303 (Wash. 1986).
98. State v. Lair, 630 P.2d 427, 433 (Wash. 1981).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See State v. Kennedy, 726 P.2d 445, 449 (Wash. 1986) (holding that, based on knowledge
the officer had gained through officer’s prior narcotics investigations, he could have reasonably
concluded that a baggie he seized contained drugs).
103. State v. Murray, 527 P.2d 1303, 1307 (Wash. 1974).
104. Id.
105. Id. (emphasis added).
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discretion to seize first and decipher a piece of evidence’s incriminating
nature later.
Law enforcement filming with body-worn cameras in Washington
will likely encounter plain view evidence that is unequivocally
incriminating in the course of many lawful searches or other situations in
which they have a lawful prior justification for being in a given area.106
Evidence of this class might include illegal guns or knives, drugs in
powder or pill form and relevant paraphernalia, or child pornography.
Other objects captured on film, however, might not readily display an
overt, incriminating nature.
Take, for example, a package concealed in, but bulging underneath,
a suspect’s pants or jacket pocket. Upon squeezing the pocket in the
course of a lawful pat-down for weapons,107 suppose the officer feels
what he determines to be a small baggie containing a powder or
crystalline substance—something that he does not know for sure, but
suspects to be contraband given his experience.108 Do these
circumstances furnish enough of an indication that the bulge holds an
incriminating character? Can the officer seize the contents in the
suspect’s pocket based on his plain-feel discovery?
In State v. Garvin, the Washington Supreme Court was faced with a
situation akin to the one described above but decided the case on other
grounds.109 The facts in Garvin, however, reveal how footage from a
body-worn camera could augment what otherwise might be only
marginal suspicion of an object’s incriminating nature from an officer’s
touch, which would not be enough to seize the object.110
Similarly, the sight of an object that looks suspicious is not always
enough for the officer to seize the item under the plain view doctrine.111
For example, in State v. Cotten, FBI agents discovered a shotgun
protruding from the defendant’s bedcovers while they searched his room

106. Given the number of cities currently implementing or piloting police body-worn camera
programs in Washington, many officers have likely already made records of such evidence.
See supra Part I.
107. A pat-down, or “Terry search,” refers to a constitutionally permissible limited search of a
suspect’s outer clothing which an officer is justified in conducting when he has a reasonable
articulable suspicion the suspect has weapons on his person that could harm the officer or others. See
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968).
108. The facts of this hypothetical are closely based on the facts of State v. Garvin, 207 P.3d
1266, 1268–69 (Wash. 2009).
109. Garvin, 207 P.3d at 1272–73 (reversing the defendant’s conviction on the grounds that the
scope of the officer’s pat-down was unreasonable and holding that the evidence should have been
suppressed once the officer determined the bulge he felt in the pocket was not a weapon).
110. State v. Hudson, 874 P.2d 160, 166 (Wash. 1994) (holding that an officer must
immediately recognize the incriminating nature of evidence he touches).
111. State v. Cotten, 879 P.2d 971, 979 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).
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for evidence in a bombing investigation.112 The court held the plain view
doctrine did not justify the FBI’s seizure of the gun because the agents
lacked knowledge of the suspect’s involvement in a shooting.113 The gun,
therefore, lacked an “immediately apparent” incriminating nature.114
Police department manuals, including Seattle’s, however, provide
that officers may review footage previously recorded by body-worn
cameras in a limited number of situations.115 One of these situations is in
preparation for criminal investigations.116 Most of the state’s police
departments, including Seattle’s, have not yet specified the amount of
time or the level of thoroughness an officer may or should allot for
reviewing a previously recorded incident that led to an arrest.117
Similarly, policies lack answers regarding whether police officers can or
ought to watch previously filmed footage in slow motion, enhance the
images on the film, rewind and watch a particular scene unfold again, or
stop the film at points to take notes or examine a particular shot in detail.
To be sure, footage from body-worn cameras serves the interest of
justice in a significant way; it preserves a clear record of images and
sounds that an officer can use in preparation for a subsequent
fact-finding proceeding. Allowing officers to return to a film before
testifying at trial provides officers an avenue to refresh their memories of
an incident and proffer more accurate testimony at a criminal
proceeding.118
However, could video that does arrive at the courtroom confer on
testifying officers a disproportionate advantage? Recent scholarship on
body-worn cameras unveils the concern that the officer—not the
individual subject to a stop, search, seizure, or arrest—influences how a
112. Id.
113. Id. The court in Cotten explained that, because the officers were conducting a search of a
suspect’s bedroom (in his mother’s home with his mother’s consent), the officers had authority to
briefly seize dangerous weapons they encountered, so removing bullets from the gun or “otherwise
rendering the weapon temporarily unusable,” as well as keeping the gun with the officers was
lawful. Id. at 980. The seizure, however, could not be justified under the plain view doctrine. Id.
114. Id.
115. SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T, SEATTLE POLICE MANUAL DIRECTIVE NO. 14-00062, NEW
MANUAL SECTION: 16.091 – BODY-WORN VIDEO PILOT PROGRAM, Pt. 16.091-POL-2, ¶ 2
(Dec. 20, 2015), http://spdblotter.seattle.gov/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/12_17_14-Policy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N4JD-YZHJ].
116. Id.
117. See id.
118. In fact, some reports underscore the concern that given the volume of body-worn camera
videos, footage favorable to defendants might slip through the cracks. HURLEY, supra note 88, at 7.
Given the amount of video that will amass, as well as the uploading, sorting, and cataloguing police
departments must undertake, “there will inevitably be cases in which video that was taken and
classified by an officer will be lost or destroyed before being examined by the defendant or
presented in the case.” Id.
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video is created.119 An officer cannot alter film after recording it,120 yet
the officer still determines, at least to a notable degree, what ends up in a
video and what gets left out. The officer does not control every image he
captures with his camera, but still has more control than the subject of
the film to make a record of incriminating evidence against that subject.
The camera is not pointed on the officer, nor does it capture all of his
relevant demeanor and body language. Similarly, officers will not point
their cameras at unimportant, collateral scenes, people, or objects. In the
course of a search, officers are likely to make a record—likely in good
faith—of that which looked suspect to them, not that which looked
innocent and benign.
As Washington courts have noted in evaluating the reasonableness
of police making observations in the course of their work, an officer “is
trained to observe to a higher degree than the average citizen.”121 The
preparation that law enforcement agents undergo to effectively
investigate crimes, including training to perceive what ordinary civilians
might miss, situates police officers in a position to return from a search
with video footage that strongly aligns with their suspicions of a given
area or person.
An officer reviewing a film in preparation for trial will
likely be able to uncover more factual support for the conclusion that an
object or substance holds a set of characteristics that rendered it
“immediately incriminating”—especially if further independent
investigation or a suspect’s confession confirms that the object was
indeed related to criminal activity. Returning to the facts of Garvin, had
the officers used cameras to record the encounter, the video could have
easily captured an image defining the contours of the bulge in the
defendant’s pocket and corroborated the officer’s suspicion that the
pocket held a baggie containing contraband. The video could have also
captured the way the defendant might have been trying to conceal the
contents of his pocket with his hand movements, clothing, or stance.122
Similarly, body-worn camera footage of the shotgun seized in Cotton
could have augmented the State’s argument that the weapon displayed an
immediately incriminating character.
119. Considering Police Body Cameras, supra note 13, at 1805–07.
120. To prevent deletion or editing of a video, Seattle has used a system of “hash tags” to
encrypt a video so it cannot be altered after it is uploaded to the department’s cloud storage system.
SPD Answers Your Questions, supra note 38.
121. State v. Graffius, 871 P.2d 1115, 1119 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).
122. It is important to note here that cameras can also surely provide a record that is
exculpatory to suspects who are the subject of the film. The aim of this Note is to explore how police
officer body-worn cameras might reify or make more convincing evidence in the record already
obtained by law enforcement.
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Revisiting a film allows the government to retroactively justify a
prior determination that a seized object held an immediately
incriminating character. This erodes the limits on the plain view doctrine.
As the court explained more than forty years ago in State v. Murray, the
first Washington case to chart the doctrine’s boundaries, the plain view
exception to the warrant requirement was not intended to give officers
broad evidence-gathering privileges.123 Rather, the plain view exception
grew out of the common sense notion that law enforcement agents
should not turn a blind eye to dangerous or significant evidence of
criminal activity in front of them while they lawfully execute their
duties.124 The problem with footage from body-worn cameras is that the
evidence returns to being, for all relevant purposes, “in front of” the
officer again if he later examines it—it furnishes another opportunity for
an object’s incriminating nature to readily appear.
III. PICKING UP PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS: AUDIO RECORDINGS FROM
BODY-WORN CAMERAS THAT VIOLATE WASHINGTON’S PRIVACY ACT
A. Officer–Civilian Conversations: Is a Fair Warning Required?
A second problem surrounding evidence-gathering capacities of
police body-worn cameras arises upon examining Washington’s Privacy
Act.125 The Washington Supreme Court resolved some questions about
the legality of officers recording audio of their conversations with
civilians in Lewis v. State Department of Licensing.126 In Lewis, the court
held that conversations between a civilian and a police officer executing
his official duties at a traffic stop are not private.127 However, the court in
Lewis interpreted the Privacy Act to “tip[] the balance in favor of
individual privacy at the expense of law enforcement’s ability to gather
evidence without a warrant.”128 The court specifically examined
RCW 9.73.090(1)(c), the portion of the Privacy Act that governs sound
recordings that correspond to video images recorded by cameras
mounted on dashboards of law enforcement patrol vehicles, or
“dash-cams.” RCW 9.73.090(1)(c) provides in relevant part,
[a] law enforcement officer shall inform any person being recorded
by sound under this subsection (1)(c) that a sound recording is being
made and the statement so informing the person shall be included in
123. See State v. Murray, 527 P.2d 1303, 1307 (Wash. 1974).
124. Id.
125. See State v. Kipp, 317 P.3d 1029, 1032 (Wash. 2014).
126. See generally Lewis v. Washington, 139 P.3d 1078 (Wash. 2006).
127. Id. at 1083.
128. Id. at 1082.
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the sound recording, except that the law enforcement officer is not
required to inform the person being recorded if the person is being
recorded under exigent circumstances. A law enforcement officer is
not required to inform a person being recorded by video under this
subsection (1)(c) that the person is being recorded by video.129

The court held the statute’s plain language mandated the officers,
who recorded audio of their conversations with the defendants from their
dash-cams, to inform drivers that they were recording and make a record
of the warning on the recording.130 Because the officers failed to issue
this warning, the court concluded that the trial court should have
suppressed the evidence of the conversations at the traffic stop.131
Lewis suggests officers filming with body-worn cameras, like
officers filming with dash-cams, should also be required to inform
civilians they encounter that their camera’s microphones are turned on—
otherwise, the capture will be unlawful. Notably, the Seattle Police
Department took no risks in its pilot program with twelve officers from
the city’s East Precinct; the department required the officers to give a
verbal warning to anyone they filmed.132 The Washington State
Legislature, however, has yet to extend the requirements for dashboard
cameras contained in RCW 9.73.090(1)(c) to police body-worn
cameras.133
B. Conversations Between Civilians: Picking up Private Conversations
The Privacy Act’s “all-party consent rule” is a distinctive privacy
safeguard; only eleven states codify it in their laws.134 Generally, the rule
shelters private conversations from law enforcement’s reach; it provides
that unless all parties to a private conversation give consent, the state135
may not record their conversation.136 The Act first distinguishes between
private and public conversations; it armors the former with full-bodied
safeguards and confers none on the latter.137
129. WASH REV. CODE § 9.73.090(1)(c) (2011).
130. Lewis, 139 P.3d at 1086 (holding that an officer recording a driver at a traffic stop does
not require consent of the driver, but does require that the officer inform the driver he is recording).
131. Id.
132. SPD Answers Your Questions, supra note 38.
133. LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 33, at 3.
134. Recording Phone Calls and Conversations, DIGITAL MEDIA L. PROJECT
(May
14,
2014),
http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/recording-phone-calls-and-conversations
[https://perma.cc/JKP2-BSUQ].
135. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.030(1)(b) (1986). Not only the state, but any “individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or . . . political subdivision” is prohibited from recording a
private conversation absent the consent of all parties to that conversation. Id at § 9.73.030(1).
136. Id.
137. Lewis v. Washington, 139 P.3d 1078, 1082 (Wash. 2006).
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Because courts have not concluded an officer’s conversation with a
civilian is “public” under the Act,138 an officer is not required to obtain
the consent of a civilian before recording their exchange with a
body-worn camera. In turn, the Act does not require a civilian to obtain
consent of an officer prior to recording an oral exchange with that officer
with a cellular phone or any other electronic device.139 It is of no
consequence who holds the camera or tape recorder, who presses record,
and who halts the recording. In neither case is the recording of audio
during a pure civilian-to-officer encounter unlawful so long as at least
one party consents.140
Private conversations are different.141 Washington courts prefer a
plain definition of the word and employ a two-step test to determine
whether a conversation is private: First, the participants in the
conversation must manifest a subjective intent that the conversation be
private.142 Second, that expectation of privacy must be reasonable.143 To
make these two determinations, Washington courts consider several
factors, including the “(1) duration and subject matter of the
conversation, (2) location of conversation and presence or potential
presence of a third party, and (3) role of the nonconsenting party and his
or her relationship to the consenting party.”144 When a conversation is
private, the Act prohibits recording it by any electronic device unless all
parties to the conversation first give consent to be recorded.145
The all-party consent rule presents problems for officers recording
with body-worn cameras in the field. A 2014 Washington Attorney
General Opinion explained that while an officer recording audio with a
body-worn camera as he talks to a person on the street does not trigger
any requirement that the officer obtain that person’s consent, “a court
could conclude that some intercepted conversations in a person’s home
involving parties other than police officers might be private and not
subject to lawful recording.”146
Accordingly, if an officer lawfully enters a home where only one
person is present—because, for example, he has a search warrant or valid
consent for the entry—recording a conversation between the officer and
that person without the individual’s consent does not present a problem
138. Id. at 1084.
139. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.090(1) (1986).
140. 2014 Op. Wash Att’y Gen. No. 8 (Nov 21, 2014).
141. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.030 (1986).
142. Lewis, 139 P.3d at 1083.
143. State v. Kipp, 317 P.3d 1029, 1034 (Wash. 2014).
144. Lewis, 139 P.3d at 1083.
145. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.030(1)(b) (1986).
146. Supra note 140 (emphasis added).
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because a pure officer-to-civilian conversation is public and not
protected.147 However, an officer who lawfully enters a home where
more than one person is present and records a conversation between two
or more people with his body-worn camera might violate the Act.
Problems involving parties “other than police officers” mushroom
in cohousing units with multiple residents; apartment buildings with
communal and frequented lobbies, hallways, and rooftops; and college
dormitories with a number of shared rooms and common study spaces. It
would be both burdensome and inefficient to require officers in the field
to turn off their body-worn camera’s microphones every time they
encountered two or more people engaging in a conversation that
appeared to be private.148 Equally unreasonable would be for officers to
always approach two or more individuals speaking to each other, ask
them if they intended to keep their conversation private, and then request
their consent to record the remainder of their conversation if they
responded in the affirmative.
A near inevitability exists that officers will inadvertently record
some private conversations with body-worn cameras. For this reason,
some police departments—cognizant of the all-party consent rule—tread
carefully. In Seattle, for example, the department’s manual governing the
city’s body-worn camera program provides:
For residences or other private areas not open to the public, officers
will ask for consent to record with B[ody] W[orn] V[ideo]. The
request and any response will be recorded. If the request is denied,
officers will stop recording with BWV during the time that they are
in the private area.149

The question remains though, does the consent of one person
answering the door function as a valid authorization for an officer to
record the communications of others inside? Some police department
policies150 and draft policies151 on body-worn cameras require officers to
inform civilians they are being recorded, but do not contain express
147. Lewis, 139 P.3d at 1084.
148. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.030(1)(b) (1986). The statute requires that the party recording
“first obtaining the consent of all the persons engaged in the conversation.” Id. (emphasis added).
149. SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T, supra note 115, at ¶ 5; see also SPD Answers Your Questions,
supra note 38 (explaining that this provision of the policy was intended to comply with the state’s
all-party consent rule).
150. E.g., AIRWAY HEIGHTS POLICE DEP’T, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, Ch. 51, at 2 (Feb.
2009), https://static.spokanecity.org/documents/police/accountability/bodycamera/airway-heightsbody-camera-policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/4RFG-K3CY].
151. E.g., SPOKANE POLICE DEP’T, DRAFT POLICY 703: BODY CAMERAS 1 (Nov. 2014),
https://static.spokanecity.org/documents/police/accountability/bodycamera/body-camera-policyrevised-draft-11-01-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/HMC8-KEHT].
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language regarding consent. Situations in which a private area holds
many occupants will present challenges for officers to adequately obtain
valid consent from every speaker.
Recent court decisions hint that police body-worn cameras’
recordings of private civilian-to-civilian conversations will be suppressed
in criminal proceedings, but provide no definitive answer. In State v.
Kipp, for example, the court held the secret recording of a conversation
between a defendant and his brother-in-law violated the Privacy Act.152
Reversing the trial court, the Washington Supreme Court held that the
conversation, which centered on the accusation that Kipp had molested
two of his nieces, was private under the Act because (1) the defendant,
speaking to his brother-in-law in an upstairs kitchen, a room occupied by
only one other person who was exiting, manifested his intent to keep his
conversation confidential, and (2) this expectation of privacy was
reasonable given the conversation occurred in a home, lasted over ten
minutes, and broached grave topics.153
The court concluded that because the brother-in-law recorded the
conversation in violation of the Privacy Act,154 the trial court should have
suppressed the audio recording of the conversation at the subsequent
criminal proceeding.155 Kipp provides a foundation for an argument that
audio recordings made of private conversations through a police officer’s
body-worn camera are equally tainted evidence and should also be
suppressed. If the subjects of the recording, like the defendant in Kipp,
freely speak to one another, unaware that a body-worn camera is
recording their voices, it is unlikely that the recording of this
conversation could be used against them in court, particularly if they are
speaking in a context where the circumstances point to a reasonable
expectation of privacy. They might, for example, be conversing behind a
closed bedroom door or out of sight, but not earshot, of an officer filming
elsewhere in the home.
Questions about how to apply Kipp, however, still linger. What if
two or more people know their private conversation might have been
recorded—because, for example, they see an officer wearing a camera—
but do not realize they ever had a right to withhold consent to an audio
recording of their voices? Should courts also suppress these
conversations?156
152. State v. Kipp, 317 P.3d 1029, 1034 (Wash. 2014).
153. Id.
154. The brother-in-law turned the recording over to law enforcement to be used in
investigation and for protection. Id. at 1031.
155. Id. at 1037.
156. In the context of the home, Washington case law suggests the answer may be yes. See
State v. Ferrier, 960 P.2d 927, 934 (Wash. 1998) (holding that, in the context of the home, the
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Furthermore, an officer might unintentionally record a private
conversation. Both the officer and the civilian parties might be unaware
that the conversation has been captured until after the officer is
dispatched to another call, returns to the station, or ends a shift.
Washington courts note that overhearing incriminating conversations or
other auditory evidence of a crime in a place where the officer has a legal
right to be does not require the officer to plug his ears.157 In these
situations, the inadvertent recording of the communication—either
because the officer did not realize the conversation was private or realize
his camera was recording—might also be suppressed. Assuming the
officer acted in good faith and did not, like the law enforcement agents in
Kipp, attempt to secretly harvest confidential information, however, the
State might have a strong argument that the conversations should be
admitted in a criminal proceeding.
Still,
concerns
regarding
random
and
widespread
“oversurveilling”158 remain. Notably, the Privacy Act does not require
that a recording be made knowingly for it to violate the all-party consent
rule.159 Good faith might not be enough.
IV. THE COURT AS REFEREE OF EVIDENCE AND PROTECTOR
OF THE JURY’S FUNCTION
Trial courts and juries will be the first to the wrestle with evidence
from body-worn cameras in criminal trials. Accordingly, Washington
trial court judges should assume the responsibility of gatekeepers and
exclude evidence derived from body-worn cameras when it arises in a
context that unreasonably stretches the boundaries of the plain view
doctrine or when it defies the Privacy Act’s all-party consent rule.
A. Perspective Matters: The Jury’s Role as Fact Finder in the Wake of
Body-Worn Camera Footage
In considering the potential for body-worn cameras to generate a
large body of evidence, it is important to recognize that the cameras
benefit not only the government—using this evidence to investigate and
prosecute crimes—but to criminal defendants as well. Videos create a

waiver of a defendant’s rights must be the product of an informed decision). Because Ferrier
addressed a constitutional right—to require production of a warrant—courts may not extend
Ferrier’s rule to a violation of a statutory right under the Privacy Act.
157. State v. Ruem, 313 P.3d 1156, 1168 (Wash. 2013) (Johnson, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (using the illustrative hypothetical of an officer unexpectedly hearing the crying
of a kidnapped infant).
158. La Corte, supra note 30.
159. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.030(1)(b) (1986).
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clear record of events for juries.160 They deliver more verifiable evidence
than eyewitness testimony, which is often presented months after an
arrest.161
Video evidence has the potential to both exonerate defendants who
are factually innocent and incriminate guilty actors who otherwise would
go free. These benefits should not be ignored. The ironic problem that
arises from videos capturing arrests, or events leading up to arrests,
however, is that they might be too trustworthy. The “third witness” that
Airway Heights Police Chief Lee Bennett describes could win an
inordinate amount of favor with juries.162 A video in the courtroom—
whether it be body-worn camera footage, a civilian’s cell phone video of
a street corner arrest, surveillance footage, or an officer’s in-car video
recording of a traffic stop—holds sway with jurors.163
Seth W. Stoughton, a former police officer and a professor at
the University of South Carolina School of Law, produced a series of
videos that highlight how the position and angle of a camera informs the
way people interpret video of police–civilian interactions.164 One video,
filmed from an officer’s camera mounted on his chest, depicts a foot
pursuit ending with both the civilian and the officer on the ground. The
picture is jerky, the frame bounces frantically, and the images cut left and
right.165 The officer yells, “He is reaching for my gun!”166 A second
video shows the same foot pursuit, this time without the officer’s
shouting; it is filmed by a bystander with a cellular phone, standing a few
yards away.167 In the first video, 85% of viewers concluded the civilian
never reached for the officer’s gun.168 In the second video, however 10%
more viewers reported they did not see the suspect reach for the officer’s
gun.169
Another video shows an officer’s body-worn camera capture an
interaction with a civilian at close range—again, the video bounces
rapidly and the viewer only catches shaky glimpses of the civilian’s
160. See MILLER, supra note 18, at 9.
161. Not forgotten are the original reasons cities wanted body-worn cameras on officers in the
first place: to contribute to a body of documentation to either prove or disprove claims of police
misconduct. Courts often rely on videos from vehicle-mounted cameras of police encounters with
civilians in evaluating excessive force claims. See supra INTRODUCTION.
162. See Loney, supra note 3.
163. See Considering Police Body Cameras, supra note 13, at 1812–14.
164. Timothy Williams, James Thomas, Samuel Jacoby & Damien Cave, Police Body
Cameras:
What
Do
You
See?,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
1,
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/04/01/us/police-bodycam-video.html?_r=0.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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arms, torso, and face.170 No weapon is visible. In this video, 32% of
80,000 viewers thought the officer faced a “very threatening”
situation.171 A following video, filmed from a distance, reveals the
officer and the civilian were dancing to fast-paced music, not fighting.172
Jurors are tasked with assessing the weight and credibility of all evidence
presented in court, including videos. Different videos of the same event,
however, like the ones Stoughton produced can provide variable
narratives. Given the ability of a video and its audio to inform ideas
about an encounter between a police officer and a suspect, courts should
scrutinize evidence arising from body-worn video with special care in
pretrial proceedings.
The Washington legislature will likely ultimately craft the rules
surrounding permissible investigative use and the admissibility of film
and audio from body-worn cameras. Washington recently passed a bill
aimed at protecting privacy and preventing “voyeurism or exploitation”
of footage from body-worn cameras by limiting disclosure of footage
under the Public Records Act.173 This bill does not, however, reconcile
the problems that arise considering body-worn camera evidence in light
of the plain view doctrine and the Privacy Act.174 Legislative action takes
time.175 In the interim, judges ought to safeguard the jury’s fact-finding
province. Trial court judges hold great discretion to admit or suppress
evidence,176 and appellate courts hesitate to overturn their decisions when
they act within this discretion.177 Trial courts are, therefore,
particularly well-positioned to preserve a jurisprudence that distinguishes
Washington as protector of its residents’ privacy178 in the face of massive
amounts of new evidence from police body-worn cameras.
170. Id.
171. Id. The largest number of viewers (45%) reported they were “somewhat confident” in
their answers. Id. Notably, most of the viewers who did not perceive a “very threating” situation still
thought the encounter posed at least some threat to the officer in the video; they responded that the
situation was either “somewhat,” or “a little” threatening. Id. Only 7% of viewers responded that the
situation was “not threatening.” Id.
172. Id.
173. H.B. 2362, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2016).
174. See id.
175. At least three bills before House Bill 2362 died in the Washington State legislature. See
Derrick Nunnally, Police Body-Camera Bill Stirs Debate Over Privacy, Power, SEATTLE TIMES
(Feb. 25, 2015, 7:23 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/police-body-camerabill-stirs-debate-over-privacy-power/ [https://perma.cc/LP86-WFRK]. Although House Bill 2362
provides a comprehensive framework for departments to craft policies regarding the retention and
release of videos, it does not address any specific rules for reconciling audio from body-worn
cameras with the Privacy Act’s all-party consent rule. See H.B. 2362.
176. State v. Brown, 940 P.2d 546, 569 (Wash. 1997).
177. Id.
178. State v. Kipp, 317 P.3d 1029, 1032 (Wash. 2014) (noting that the Privacy Act’s all-party
consent rule, for example, provides more protection than either the federal or the state constitution).
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B. Judges as Umpires: Excluding Evidence that Exceeds the Bounds of
the Plain View Doctrine and the Privacy Act
Courts can resolve, or at least mitigate, the first problem with
body-worn cameras and the plain view doctrine—the potential for
officers to record evidence in a location in which they (intentionally or
not) unlawfully intrude—by continuing to apply the plain view doctrine
as they have for roughly the past forty years.179 Courts should suppress
footage obtained in plain view when the officer was unlawfully present
in the location where the officer seized it. This means that in a case like
Ruem, had there been a video depicting marijuana plants in the
defendant’s home, the video should have been excluded. Because Ruem
revoked his consent to officers being on his property, their presence
became unlawful before they viewed the plants.180 Accordingly, any
video from a body-worn camera depicting the plants would have also
been filmed in an unlawful context.
Second, courts should not permit a video to substitute for an
officer’s personal account that she knew the evidence seized in plain
view held an incriminating nature at the time she seized it. If a court
admits video evidence depicting a plain view seizure made in the course
of a lawful search, the video should be accompanied by testimony from
the police officer whose body-worn camera recorded it or from another
officer qualified to authenticate the video.181 Film and audio that meets
other evidentiary requirements for admissibility182 should still be
admitted under the plain view doctrine. In this case, the defendant should
be able to cross-examine the officer regarding the content of the video
and the officer’s recollection of whether the evidence held immediately
incriminating characteristics at the time of the seizure.
Furthermore, rules from Lewis and Kipp should extend to audio
recordings that officers make with body-worn cameras. The protections
that apply to dashboard cameras, which require an officer to inform a
motorist that she is being recorded, should also apply to body-worn
179. See generally State v. Murray, 527 P.2d 1303, 1307 (Wash. 1974) (recognizing the plain
view doctrine for the first time in the Washington Supreme Court).
180. State v. Ruem, 313 P.3d 1156, 1164 (Wash. 2013).
181. LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 33, at 8. If footage is admitted at trial, the government should
also demonstrate that the chain of custody from the original video to the video presented at trial has
remained uncompromised. The state, or the defendant (if the proponent of the video), should offer
foundation testimony from technicians to describe the functionality of a given camera and the
processes through which the film is uploaded, stored, and retrieved. Id.
182. Footage will also be subject to ordinary state rules of evidence and constitutional
provisions—which means it may be suppressed on other grounds. For example, audio footage may
contain testimonial hearsay that courts should exclude if the defendant lacks an opportunity to
confront the speaker in the video through cross-examination. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S.
813, 822 (2006).

2016]

Recording a New Frontier in Evidence-Gathering

297

cameras. More troublesome are audio recordings of the defendant’s
private conversations, like the conversation in Kipp, which officers
illegally obtained in violation of the all-party consent rule. These private
conversations could be stand-alone evidence183 or they might lead
officers to evidence of further criminal activity.184 Private conversations
captured on a body-worn camera’s audio recording should not be
harvested for use in prosecution. Courts should suppress recordings of
private conversations.
Finally, courts should not condone law enforcement using evidence
recorded on a body-worn camera to further their investigations when it
defies the limits of the plain view doctrine or contravenes the Privacy
Act’s protections. This requires judges to deny requests for search
warrants when probable cause rests only on (1) an unlawfully recorded
private conversation, (2) visual recordings made in a location where an
officer lacked a prior justification for being, (3) or a recording that
captures evidence an officer did not immediately recognize as
incriminating. This does not mean that if an officer has inadvertently
recorded evidence illegally, that law enforcement cannot obtain probable
cause through independent sources of evidence.185 It only means courts
should not permit law enforcement to base warrant applications on film
or audio evidence created in impermissible contexts.
The aim here is not necessarily to reduce the number of videos that
juries view. Nor is it to eliminate body-worn camera videos as materials
an officer may review so that they can offer the most accurate testimony
possible at trial. Neither is it meant to entirely thwart the potential for
body-worn cameras’ recordings to be useful tools in investigation.
Rather, the goal of these recommendations centers on protecting against
footage and audio that blurs the common sense boundaries of the plain
view doctrine and chips away at the buffer of privacy the legislature
constructed with the Privacy Act’s all-party consent rule.
CONCLUSION
Whether law enforcement’s body-worn camera programs mark a
novel reshaping of policing practices in the United States or merely
183. As in Kipp, it could be an admission of a defendant’s criminal activities. State v. Kipp,
317 P.3d 1029, 1031 (Wash. 2014).
184. A private conversation of this nature could, for example, contain statements regarding the
location of the fruits of a crime or name other witnesses or victims.
185. State v. Gaines, 116 P.3d 993, 996 (Wash. 2005) (recognizing the “independent source
doctrine” in Washington, which provides “evidence tainted by unlawful governmental action is not
subject to suppression under the exclusionary rule, provided that it ultimately is obtained pursuant to
a valid warrant or other lawful means independent of the unlawful action”).
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signal a revamping of community policing with the help of new
technology, they will certainly have an impact on the evidence-gathering
abilities of officers. They have and will continue to act as independent,
but perhaps not entirely unbiased, “third witnesses.” In turn, they have
the potential to collide with some of Washington’s existing privacy
protections.
This Note has catalogued the difficulty in situating evidence
obtained through the use of police body cameras in the framework of
Washington State’s plain view doctrine and the Privacy Act’s all-party
consent rule. First, under the plain view doctrine, questions will likely
arise regarding whether footage was obtained while an officer enjoyed a
prior justification for an intrusion of privacy or whether the intrusion
lacked the authority of law. Courts will also likely encounter challenging
questions of whether evidence catalogued on videotape had a nature so
incriminating that it was “immediately apparent” at the time it was seized
or whether it merely held a suspicious character that was later rationalized as incriminating. Second, officers with body-worn cameras—
intentionally or unwittingly—may record a private conversation under
the Privacy Act without the consent of all participants. This Note argues
that in certain situations, this audio and video evidence should be
excluded.
The legislature may craft admissibility rules and a more
comprehensive framework in which to place footage from body-worn
cameras, but uncertainty remains. This Note urges trial courts to act as
gatekeepers in the interim. Courts should strictly apply the requirements
of the plain view doctrine and the Privacy Act. In doing so, trial courts
should reconcile the quickly emerging technological advances growing
increasingly common in our society with the underlying robust principals
of privacy that have distinguished Washington in its restriction of new
technology-based law enforcement tools. While the law often lags behind
technological advances, we should not dismiss our criminal justice
system as incapable of fairly situating new evidence-gathering tools
within its existing privacy framework.

